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	<title>Comments on: Secure, Reliable E-Voting:  It&#8217;s not that damn hard!</title>
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	<description>Bad Science And Scary Science</description>
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		<title>By: drbuzz0</title>
		<link>http://depletedcranium.com/secure-reliable-e-voting-its-not-that-damn-hard/comment-page-1/#comment-22600</link>
		<dc:creator>drbuzz0</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Mar 2010 22:20:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://depletedcranium.com/?p=64#comment-22600</guid>
		<description>[quote comment=&quot;22586&quot;]One point on the voting machine.  You can&#039;t give a receipt to voters showing how they cast their votes.  Part of the reason for casting secret ballots is not just to protect the voter from retaliation for making the &quot;wrong&quot; vote, but to prevent the voter from being able to prove to a vote-buyer that he/she voted in a given way.

Here is a simplistic version of the argument, but the point is valid.  If a politician wants to buy my vote, he can require me to show him my voter receipt as a condition of payment.  To him, the value of paying for my vote is high, because he can be assured that he&#039;s getting the vote he is paying for.  If there are no voter receipts then I cannot prove to a politician that I actually voted for him.  Thus, the value of a vote-buying effort is substantially reduced.

The current system with no receipts discourages direct vote-buying, because a politician can never know that he&#039;s getting what he&#039;s paying for.[/quote]


That&#039;s a good point.  That one feature may be something that is not such a good idea.  My thought on it was that it would prevent people (I was thinking mostly old people) from suddenly going nuts if they started to think that they might remember having pushed the wrong button.

So yeah, receipts might be out, although these days it&#039;s not like there aren&#039;t other potential ways of doing it.  A person could video themselves voting with their cell phone or something.</description>
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<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href="http://depletedcranium.com/secure-reliable-e-voting-its-not-that-damn-hard/#comment-22586"><b>Shafe said:</b></a></p>
<blockquote cite="http://depletedcranium.com/secure-reliable-e-voting-its-not-that-damn-hard/#comment-22586"><p>
One point on the voting machine.  You can&#8217;t give a receipt to voters showing how they cast their votes.  Part of the reason for casting secret ballots is not just to protect the voter from retaliation for making the &#8220;wrong&#8221; vote, but to prevent the voter from being able to prove to a vote-buyer that he/she voted in a given way.</p>
<p>Here is a simplistic version of the argument, but the point is valid.  If a politician wants to buy my vote, he can require me to show him my voter receipt as a condition of payment.  To him, the value of paying for my vote is high, because he can be assured that he&#8217;s getting the vote he is paying for.  If there are no voter receipts then I cannot prove to a politician that I actually voted for him.  Thus, the value of a vote-buying effort is substantially reduced.</p>
<p>The current system with no receipts discourages direct vote-buying, because a politician can never know that he&#8217;s getting what he&#8217;s paying for.</p>
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<p>That&#8217;s a good point.  That one feature may be something that is not such a good idea.  My thought on it was that it would prevent people (I was thinking mostly old people) from suddenly going nuts if they started to think that they might remember having pushed the wrong button.</p>
<p>So yeah, receipts might be out, although these days it&#8217;s not like there aren&#8217;t other potential ways of doing it.  A person could video themselves voting with their cell phone or something.</p>
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		<title>By: Shafe</title>
		<link>http://depletedcranium.com/secure-reliable-e-voting-its-not-that-damn-hard/comment-page-1/#comment-22586</link>
		<dc:creator>Shafe</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Mar 2010 07:15:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://depletedcranium.com/?p=64#comment-22586</guid>
		<description>One point on the voting machine.  You can&#039;t give a receipt to voters showing how they cast their votes.  Part of the reason for casting secret ballots is not just to protect the voter from retaliation for making the &quot;wrong&quot; vote, but to prevent the voter from being able to prove to a vote-buyer that he/she voted in a given way.

Here is a simplistic version of the argument, but the point is valid.  If a politician wants to buy my vote, he can require me to show him my voter receipt as a condition of payment.  To him, the value of paying for my vote is high, because he can be assured that he&#039;s getting the vote he is paying for.  If there are no voter receipts then I cannot prove to a politician that I actually voted for him.  Thus, the value of a vote-buying effort is substantially reduced.

The current system with no receipts discourages direct vote-buying, because a politician can never know that he&#039;s getting what he&#039;s paying for.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One point on the voting machine.  You can&#8217;t give a receipt to voters showing how they cast their votes.  Part of the reason for casting secret ballots is not just to protect the voter from retaliation for making the &#8220;wrong&#8221; vote, but to prevent the voter from being able to prove to a vote-buyer that he/she voted in a given way.</p>
<p>Here is a simplistic version of the argument, but the point is valid.  If a politician wants to buy my vote, he can require me to show him my voter receipt as a condition of payment.  To him, the value of paying for my vote is high, because he can be assured that he&#8217;s getting the vote he is paying for.  If there are no voter receipts then I cannot prove to a politician that I actually voted for him.  Thus, the value of a vote-buying effort is substantially reduced.</p>
<p>The current system with no receipts discourages direct vote-buying, because a politician can never know that he&#8217;s getting what he&#8217;s paying for.</p>
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		<title>By: Kevin</title>
		<link>http://depletedcranium.com/secure-reliable-e-voting-its-not-that-damn-hard/comment-page-1/#comment-17916</link>
		<dc:creator>Kevin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 18 Jul 2009 19:52:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://depletedcranium.com/?p=64#comment-17916</guid>
		<description>I&#039;ve also done a good review on &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.satellitetv4mypc.net&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Satellite TV for MY PC&lt;/a&gt;. My team has tested this software thoroughly and the review is worth a good read</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;ve also done a good review on <a href="http://www.satellitetv4mypc.net" rel="nofollow">Satellite TV for MY PC</a>. My team has tested this software thoroughly and the review is worth a good read</p>
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		<title>By: Satellite TV for PC Instantly Turn your Computer into a Super TV</title>
		<link>http://depletedcranium.com/secure-reliable-e-voting-its-not-that-damn-hard/comment-page-1/#comment-108</link>
		<dc:creator>Satellite TV for PC Instantly Turn your Computer into a Super TV</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 Aug 2007 20:18:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://depletedcranium.com/?p=64#comment-108</guid>
		<description>&lt;strong&gt;Satellite TV for PC Instantly Turn your Computer into a Super TV &lt;/strong&gt;

Satellite TV for PC Instantly Turn your Computer into a Super TV</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Satellite TV for PC Instantly Turn your Computer into a Super TV </strong></p>
<p>Satellite TV for PC Instantly Turn your Computer into a Super TV</p>
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		<title>By: drbuzz0</title>
		<link>http://depletedcranium.com/secure-reliable-e-voting-its-not-that-damn-hard/comment-page-1/#comment-91</link>
		<dc:creator>drbuzz0</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 03 Aug 2007 04:26:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://depletedcranium.com/?p=64#comment-91</guid>
		<description>I agree with that to a point.  But there&#039;s no way to know that the ballots have not been replaced once the voter leaves.   With the machine you could at least check to see if more vote receipts for a machine for a certain candidate exist than the machine&#039;s card records.  

No, you really can&#039;t be &quot;perfect&quot; because as long as the electoral commission doesn&#039;t allow each and every person to personally count the votes, there has to be some trust that the government isn&#039;t completely conspiring to rig every machine and cover it up.

But it ends up working a lot better than the machines commonly used now.   In my town, for example, a flick a switch in a booth which turns a cog on an old-fashioned numeric dial that is viewed when the machine is opened.   There&#039;s no way I can ever know if the person reading it is honest or if the machine has not malfunctioned.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I agree with that to a point.  But there&#8217;s no way to know that the ballots have not been replaced once the voter leaves.   With the machine you could at least check to see if more vote receipts for a machine for a certain candidate exist than the machine&#8217;s card records.  </p>
<p>No, you really can&#8217;t be &#8220;perfect&#8221; because as long as the electoral commission doesn&#8217;t allow each and every person to personally count the votes, there has to be some trust that the government isn&#8217;t completely conspiring to rig every machine and cover it up.</p>
<p>But it ends up working a lot better than the machines commonly used now.   In my town, for example, a flick a switch in a booth which turns a cog on an old-fashioned numeric dial that is viewed when the machine is opened.   There&#8217;s no way I can ever know if the person reading it is honest or if the machine has not malfunctioned.</p>
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		<title>By: Guest</title>
		<link>http://depletedcranium.com/secure-reliable-e-voting-its-not-that-damn-hard/comment-page-1/#comment-90</link>
		<dc:creator>Guest</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 03 Aug 2007 02:58:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://depletedcranium.com/?p=64#comment-90</guid>
		<description>Unless the officially recorded ballots are human readable, there is no way to be sure an electronic voting machine hasn&#039;t been rigged to tell voters it has recorded a vote for Y but actually records their vote as one for X.  The only way to defend against lying voting machines is for the actual ballot to be readable by the voter rather than an invisible bit in digital storage.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Unless the officially recorded ballots are human readable, there is no way to be sure an electronic voting machine hasn&#8217;t been rigged to tell voters it has recorded a vote for Y but actually records their vote as one for X.  The only way to defend against lying voting machines is for the actual ballot to be readable by the voter rather than an invisible bit in digital storage.</p>
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